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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction of this appeal under
Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)G). Pursuant to its authority under Utah Code section
78A-3-102(4) and Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 42(a), the Utah Supreme Court
transferred this appeal to this Court on September 8, 2015. This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)O).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STAND ARDS OF REVIEW 1
Appellee does not agree with and is dissatisfied with Appellant's statement of the
issues on appeal and statement of the case. Pursuant to Rule 24(b )( 1) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, Appellee provides the following statement of the issues:

Issue No. 1: Did Judge Shumate and Judge Westfall2 agree with each other that
the original Real Estate Purchase Contract for Construction, including its twelve (12)
written addenda (together referred to as "REPC"), constitutes the entire agreement
between Appellants and Sun Hill Homes, L.C. and did these two district court judges
agree that the REPC was never modified by the parties.
Standard of Review: Judge Shumate stated at the trial in this matter that the REPC
" ... is in fact the agreement between the parties, that is basically uncontroverted". Judge
1 This

appeal arises from the district court's order granting Sun Hill Homes, L.C.'s ("Sun
Hill") Motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6) & (7).
2 Judge James Shumate was the first judge assigned to this matter. Judge Shumate
handled this case through discovery, a motion for summary judgment, and a two day trial.
After entering his findings and before Sun Hill's Rule 59 Motion, Judge Shumate retired.
The case was then transferred to Judge G. Michael Westfall and Judge Westfall reviewed
the pleadings in this case, the trial transcripts, evidence, and Sun Hill's Rule 59 Motion.
Judge Westfall then amended Judge Shumate's prior findings and conclusions of law, but
the two judges essentially agreed on all issues of fact.
I
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Westfall made the same finding in his Order granting the Rule 59 Motion. "A contract's
interpretation may be either a question of law, determined by the words of the agreement,
or a question of fact, determined by extrinsic evidence of intent. If a trial court interprets
a contract as a matter of law, we accord its construction no particular weight, reviewing
its action under a correctness standard." Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P .2d 714, 716 (Utah
1985). Factual findings made by the trial court will be upheld unless they are clearly
erroneous. Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, 577 (UT App. 1993). Here, Judge
Shumate excluded extrinsic evidence and sustained objections based on parol evidence
and held that the agreement of the parties was the language within the four comers of the
REPC and Judge Westfall agreed. Appellants also stipulated that the REPC was
integrated and admitted that it was unambiguous. Thus, the appropriate standard of
review on this issue is one of correctness. Further, the standard of review when a district
court grants a Rule 59 Motion is an abuse of discretion standard. Smith v. Fairfax Realty,
Inc., 2003 UT 41, ,I25, 82 P.3d 1064 (stating that "[u]nder our rule 59, it is well settled

that, as a general matter, the trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for
a new trial. Under this standard of review, 'we will reverse only if there is no reasonable
basis for the decision.'" ( citations omitted)).
Citation to the Record: R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr. Vol. II, 87:5-10 (Dec. 3, 2013)); R.
1752-1763, a copy of said ruling is attached to Addendum to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit
E; R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 9:8 - 10:9 (Dec. 2, 2013)); R. 2042 (Hrg. Transcr. 8:24 9:1 (Oct. 29, 2013)).

2
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Issue No. 2: Are the Appellants precluded from arguing that the REPC is not the

only agreement of the parties because of the Appellants' stipulation that the REPC is
integrated and admission that the REPC is unambiguous?
Standard of Review: During the hearing on Sun Hill's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Appellants admitted to Judge Shumate that the REPC was unambiguous.
During the trial, the Appellants stipulated that the REPC was integrated in response to a
question from Judge Shumate after an objection by Sun Hill regarding parol evidence. A
review of stipulations are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness. Lloyd v.

Lloyd, 2009 UT App 314, ~6, 221 P.3d 884 (citing Zions First Nat'! Bank, NA. v.
National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P .2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988) (stating that "[ q]uestions of
contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and on
such questions we accord the trial court's interpretation no presumption of correctness.")
and Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (stating that
"[a] stipulation is construed as a contract.")).
Citation to the Record: R. 2042 (Hrg. Transcr. 8:24 - 9: I (Oct. 29, 2013)); R.
2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 9:8 - 10:9 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
Issue No. 3: Did Judge Westfall's order on the Rule 59 Motion properly find that

Judge Shumate erred in finding that the REPC was silent with regard to the risk of loss
related to the placement of soil at the property purchased by Appellants.
Standard of Review: Judge Westfall found that the REPC was not silent on the
issue of risk of loss associated with the placement of soil at Lot 8. The standard of
review when a district court grants a Rule 59 Motion is an abuse of discretion standard.
3
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Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ,I25, 82 P.3d 1064. "A contract's
interpretation may be either a question of law, determined by the words of the agreement,
or a question of fact, determined by extrinsic evidence of intent. If a trial court interprets
a contract as a matter of law, we accord its construction no particular weight, reviewing
its action under a correctness standard." Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P .2d 714, 716 (Utah
1985) (citation omitted). Here, both judges agreed that the REPC was the entire
agreement of the parties and Judge Westfall found that Judge Shumate' interpretation was
incorrect.
Citation to Record: Judge Westfall found that:
... Judge Shumate made no finding that the parties ever mutually agreed that
Sun Hill would be responsible to ensure the suitability of the soil for a
swimming pool. He only found that Sun Hill was aware of Plaintiffs'
intention to build a swimming pool in their backyard, ... and that the
absence of any agreement between the parties as to '[t]he risk of loss
associated with the placement of as much as fifteen feet of additional soil
on Lot 8' resulted in such risk being 'placed in the hands of Sun Hill
Homes.'
R. 17 59 (emphasis in original).
Judge Westfall then found that the REPC was "far from silent'~ on the issue of risk ofloss
associated with the placement of addition soil at Lot 8. R. 1760.

Issue No. 4: Did Judge Westfall correctly find that" ... the Judgment should be
amended to correct the legal error that occurred when a contractual duty was imposed on
Sun Hill to investigate the suitability of the soil for a swimming pool." R. 1760
(emphasis added).

4
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Standard of Review: The standard of review when a district court grants a Rule 59
Motion is an abuse of discretion standard. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41,
,I25, 82 P.3d 1064 (stating that "[u]nder our rule 59, it is well settled that, as a general
matter, the trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new trial.
Under this standard of review, 'we will reverse only if there is no reasonable basis for the
decision."' (citations omitted)). "A contract's interpretation may be either a question of
law, determined by the words of the agreement, or a question of fact, determined by
extrinsic evidence of intent. If a trial court interprets a contract as a matter of law, we
accord its construction no particular weight, reviewing its action under a correctness
standard." Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985) (citation omitted)).
Citation to Record: R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 9:8 - 10:9 & 10:23 - 11: 1 (Dec.
2, 2013)); R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 9:8 - 10:9 (Dec. 2, 2013)); R. 2042 (Hrg.
Transcr. 8:24-9:1 (Oct. 29, 2013)); R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr. Vol. II, 87:5-10 (Dec. 3,
2013)); R. 1760.
Issue No. 5: Did Judge Westfall correctly find that Sun Hill was the prevailing

party and thus deserving of an award of attorneys' fees and costs where " ... there is no
basis for holding Sun Hill liable for breach of contract. .. ". R. 1760 (emphasis added).
Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law
that is reviewed for correctness. Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109, ,Il 7, 46 P.3d
753. However,·· ... [w]hich party is the prevailing party is an appropriate question for the
trial court." Crowley v. Black, 2007 UT App 245, ,r6, 167 P.3d 1087 (citing R.T. Nielson

Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ,r25, 40 P .3d 1119). As such, " ... review the trial court's
5
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determination as to who was the prevailing party [is] under an abuse of discretion
standard." Id.
Citation to Record: See R. 112-20 (Sun Hill's Answer in which claim was made
for attorney fees and costs); See Also R. 1885-94 (Sun Hill's Motion for Award of
Attorneys' Fees and Costs); See Also R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 25) (providing the
contractual basis for an award of fees in this action).

DETERMINATIVE RULE
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a) states that" ... on a motion for a new trial in
an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered,
take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment [for the following
reasons]: (a)(6) [i]nsufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or
that it is against law[; or] (a)(7) [e]rror in law." See Utah R. Civ. P. 59, a complete copy
of which is attached to this Brief in the Addendum as Exhibit A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case
The Appellant purchased a home and lot from the Appellee, Sun Hill Homes, L.C
("Sun Hill"). Sun Hill developed the lot and built the home ("Lot 8" or "Property"). Lot
8 borders the Santa Clara River. During the construction of the home on Lot 8 and due to
extensive flooding that occurred in Washington County in 2005, the government
provided for the installation of rock walls to armor the banks of the river along Lot 8 and
other adjacent lots. This rock wall armoring the river was provided by the government to
6
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help mitigate damage from future flooding of the river. Sun Hill accepted the assistance
of the Natural Resources Conservation Service Division of the US Department of
Agriculture to make changes to the grading and add rock walls to Lot 8 in order to protect
the lot and the home being constructed on Lot 8 from future flooding of the river. The
assistance from the government resulted in additional soil being added to Lot 8 and the
lot size being increased.
After the construction of the home on Lot 8 and after Appellants closed on the
purchase of the home and lot from Sun Hill, the Appellants hired Anthony Bros.
Construction ("Anthony Bros.") to construct a pool in the backyard of Lot 8. Appellants
did not properly engineer the pool that Anthony Bros. constructed on Lot 8 in spite of the
agreement between Sun Hill and the Appellants that requires that certain improvements
to Lot 8 be properly engineered by Appellants. After construction of the pool by
Anthony Bros., the pool experienced signs of differential movement and Appellants filed
the underlying lawsuit claiming damages against both Anthony Bros. and Sun Hill for the
failure of the pool.
II. Course of Proceedings
After litigating for nearly two years with Anthony Bros., which is the party that
actually constructed the Appellants pool, the Appellants filed an amended complaint in
the district court adding Sun Hill to this action. R. 95-106. Appellants alleged, among
other things, breach of contract, non-disclosure, and unjust enrichment against Sun Hill.
R. 95-106. After discovery, Sun Hill filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a
hearing was held on that Motion. R. 593-670; See Also R. 2042 (Hrg. Transcr., generally
7
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(Oct. 29, 2013)). At the October 29, 2013 hearing, Judge Shumate awarded partial
summary judgment to Sun Hill and left for trial only Appellants breach of contract claims
against Sun Hi11 3 • R. 2042 (Hrg. Transcr. 16:17-23 & 19:15-18 (Oct. 29, 2013)), portions
of the hearing held on the motion for summary judgment are included with this Brief in
the Addendum as Exhibit B.
A trial in this matter was held on December 2nd and 3rd of 2013. R. 2043 (Tr.
Transcr. Vol. I, generally); R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr. Vol. II, generally). Judge Shumate
made verbal findings on the record at the trial. The portion of the trial transcript
containing Judge Shumate's verbal findings is attached to this Brief in the Addendum as
Exhibit C. Judge Shumate ruled against Sun Hill at the trial and later entered Findings,

Conclusions, and Judgment on March 17, 2014. R. 1597-1602. Thereafter, Judge
Shumate retired and Sun Hill timely filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 59 Motion for a New Trial
("Rule 59 Motion"). R. 1661-81. After a hearing on the Rule 59 Motion before a newly
assigned judge, Judge Westfall entered his Decision and Order Granting Sun Hill Homes,
L.C.'s Motion for a New Trial. R. 1752-63; See Also R. 1783-1788, a copy of Judge
Westfall's Order Vacating Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment; Amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment is attached to this Brief in the Addendum as
Exhibit D.

Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal of Judge Westfall's ruling on the Rule 59
Motion, but because the matter of attorneys' fees had not been resolved, that appeal was
3

The trial also consisted of claims by Appellants against the Defendant Anthony Bros.
but the only claims remaining against Sun Hill were Appellants' breach of contract
claims.
8
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dismissed. See R. 1933-34; See Also Order of Summary Dismissal in Appellate Case No.
20150151-CA. After Judge Westfall awarded Sun Hill its fees under the attorneys' fees
provision of the REPC, the Appellants appealed again. R. 1991-92. This matter now
comes before this Court on the Appellants' appeal of Judge Westfall's order granting Sun
Hill's Rule 59 Motion and appeal of the judgment against Appellants for attorneys' fees
and costs.
III. Disposition in the District Court
Judge Westfall ruled in favor of Sun Hill finding that" ... the Judgment should be
amended to correct the legal error that occurred when a contractual duty was imposed on
Sun Hill to investigate the suitability of the soil for a swimming pool. Absent such duty,
there is no basis for holding Sun Hill liable for breach of contract ... ". R. 1760 (emphasis
added). Judge Westfall then ruled that Sun Hill did not breach the REPC and entered
final judgment against Appellants for Sun Hill's attorneys' fees and costs in the amount
of$47,063.91. R. 1972-1973; See Also R. 2046 (Hrg. Transcr. at 11:6-7 (June 29,
2015)).
IV. Statement of Facts
The REPC is the Parties' Agreement
1. On or about December 4, 2004, Appellants entered into a Real Estate Purchase
Contract for Construction with Sun Hill for the purchase of a lot and home to be
constructed on that lot (together the home and lot are referred to as "Property" or "Lot 8").
·--'

R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1), attached as Exhibit A to the Addendum to Appellant's Brief.

9
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2. The Real Estate Purchase Contract for Construction was signed by Marie
Mardesich, who was defined in that written agreement as "Buyer", and ultimately
included twelve (12) addenda dated from September 12, 2005 to May 15, 2006 that were
signed by both Appellants John and Marie Mardesich (the Real Estate Purchase Contract
for Construction together with the twelve written addenda are referred to herein as
"REPC"). R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. I).
3. The REPC contains an integration clause that states "[t]his Agreement together
with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and any subsequent change or extra orders,
constitutes the entire Agreement between Buyer and Seller and supersedes and replaces
any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or contracts,
verbal or written, between buyer and Seller." R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. I, REPC at § 29).
4. The REPC also states that ''[t]his Agreement cannot be changed, amended, or
altered without the written agreement of Buyer and Seller, which written agreement must
be signed by Buyer and an authorized representative of Seller." R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC
at§ 29).
5. At the hearing on Sun Hill's motion for summary judgment, and prior to trial
in this matter, Appellants conceded that the REPC was unambiguous by stating " ... this is
undisputed, and both parties agree that the REP-C [sic] is unambiguous." R. 2042 (Hrg.
Transcr. at 8:24- 9:1 (Oct. 29, 2013)), an excerpt of which is attached to this Brief in the
Addendum as Exhibit B.
6. At trial, Appellants' stipulated that the REPC is integrated when counsel for
the Appellants was asked by Judge Shumate ''[ c]ounsel, is there some ambiguity in the
10
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contract that would justify the Court looking at the parol in any way, shape, or form?";
and counsel for Appellants responded that "[y]our Honor, as far as the integration in the
contract, there isn't, although that's not where I'm going with this." R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr.,
Vol. I, at 9:24 - 10:4 (Dec. 2, 2013)), an excerpt of which is attached to this Brief in the
Addendum to as Exhibit E.
7. At trial, Judge Shumate sustained an objection limiting parol evidence that was
outside the four corners of the REPC. R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, at 9:24 - 10:4 (Dec. 2,
2013)).
8. To yet another objection on parol evidence, Judge Shumate stated "I will
receive it not for its obviously parole [sic] purpose, but to explain the actions of the parties
as they engaged in this process, the contract itself so far controls." R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr.,
Vol. I, at 10:23 - 11:1 (Dec. 2, 2013)) (emphasis added).
9. Ultimately, Judge Shumate found that the REPC or'' ... Exhibit No. 1, entered
into by the parties with all 12 addenda is in/act the agreement between the parties, that is
basically uncontroverted, and the exhibit that is in the Court's hands does and is found by
the Court to be a full and true and correct copy of that agreement." R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr.,
Vol. II, at 87:5-10 (Dec. 3, 2013)), excerpts of the Tr. Transcr. Vol. II are attached to the
Addendum to this Brief as Exhibit D.
10. Judge Westfall interpreted the REPC as the agreement between the parties and
stated that" ... Judge Shumate made no finding that the parties ever mutually agreed that
Sun Hill would be responsible to ensure the suitability of the soil for a swimming pool."
R. 1759.
11
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11. There is no written addendum or other writing signed by Buyer and an
authorized representative of Seller that states that Sun Hill would be responsible to ensure
the suitability of soil for a swimming pool in the backyard of Lot 8. See Record,
generally, for absence of any such writing.
12. Judge Westfall also concluded that the REPC was not silent with regard to the
risk of loss associated with the placement of additional soil at Lot 8 and concluded that it
was the obligation of Appellants to properly engineer improvements such as a pool. R.
1759-1760.
Terms of the Parties Agreement
13. The REPC states that "Seller's model homes and promotional materials contain
optional and extra design features such as floor coverings, decorator light fixtures, wall
coverings, window treatments, furniture, built-ins, swimming pools or spas, and
furnishings. Those items shall not be included in Buyer's Home, unless specifically
ordered and paid for in accordance with Section 7." R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 6.4)
(emphasis added).
14. The REPC does not contain any requirement that Sun Hill would construct any
pool or spa at Lot 8 and the Appellants never ordered or paid for Sun Hill to construct a
pool at Lot 8. R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC, generally).
15. The REPC states the following:
Although Buyer is entitled to select and Seller shall endeavor to provide the
Options described above, the Home shall not be constructed as nor deemed
to be a custom Home. The Home is being constructed as a single structure
within Seller's production housing development and shall be built
according to the requirements of the overall development and construction
12
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program. Accordingly, Seller reserves the right to, at its sole discretion,
make changes in tlte plans, specifications, and materials for tlte Home as
and when Seller deems necessary and appropriate.
R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at § 8) (emphasis added).

16. The REPC defines "Home" as the "[l]ot and improvements" at Lot 8. R. 204 7
(Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 1.3).
17. The REPC states that "[a]ll risk of loss to the Property, including physical
damage or destruction of the Property or its improvements due to any cause except
ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking in eminent domain, shall be borne by
Seller until the transaction is closed." R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 5.8) (emphasis
added).
18. The REPC states further in that same "Risk of Loss" section that "Ia]fter
closing all risk ofloss shall be borne by Buyer, regardless of the date and time Buyer

takes actual possession of the Home." R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 5.8) (emphasis
added).
19. The REPC states the following:
The Sunbrook Development Master Plan, as well as any other development
plans prepared by Seller, may be amended or changed from time to time to
provide for changes, modifications, or alterations to ... lot sizes and
configurations ... or other improvements .... Buyer understands that no
statement by one of Seller's representatives or any sales associate regarding
the planned use of the property in or adjacent to Sunbrook should be
understood by the buyer or anyone as a warranty or promise regarding
Seller's future development plans. By execution of this agreement and as a
material inducement to seller to accept Buyer's offer to purchase the
property, Buyer waives any right to claim any damages, costs, liabilities,
expenses or obligations against Seller, Seller's officers, employees, agents,
and subsidiaries for any changes to the Master Plan or any other zoning
ordinances or development plan for Woodlands.
13
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R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at § 11) (emphasis added).
20. The REPC states that:
Buyer [or Appellants] agrees to purchase the Property subject to the
following additional disclaimers and to release Seller from any liability, and
to indemnify Seller from any liability, with respect to the following
enumerated items: ... 14.3 Future improvements by Buyer, including walls,
fencing, grading, landscaping or excavation work on the Lot which could
disrupt drainage and/or retention and cause flooding or ponding if not
correctly engineered (and Buyer ltereby agrees to correctly engineer all
such future improvements).
R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 14 (emphasis added)).
21. The REPC states explicitly that "[i]n no event shall Seller [or Sun Hill] be
responsible for incidental or consequential damages"4. R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§
15.2).

The Increase of the Size ofLot 8
22. Prior to 2005 and at the time Lot 8 was subdivided, that lot was prepared and
graded according to the grading plan prepared by Rosenberg Associates. R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex.
16, generally); R. 1600 at ,i 27, a copy of such part of the record is attached to Appellant's
Addendum as Exhibit D; R. 1786 at ,i 28, attached to this Brief in the Addendum as
Exhibit D.

Sun Hill maintains that the trial judge erred when he awarded joint and several liability;
however, the ruling by Judge Westfall rendered the requirement to address this aspect of
Judge Shumate's ruling moot. See Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund of Utah, 2003 UT
App 438, P21, 83 P.3d 391 (stating that "Utah law holds that Plaintiffs can only recover
'general damages, which flow naturally from the breach, and consequential damages,
which, while not an invariable result of breach, were reasonably foreseeable by the
parties at the time the contract was entered into."' (citations omitted)); See A !so R. 166181; See Also R. 1760.
4
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23. In 2005, there were "epic floods" on the Santa Clara River, which river borders
Lot 8. R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, at 16:3 - 17:3 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
24.Judge Shumate found" ... by a preponderance of the evidence that the 2005
flood changed what was contemplated by the parties when they entered into [the REPC],
and that the defendant Sun Hill Homes was required to adapt to those changes. They
adapted to those changes and had every right to do so under the terms of this

contract ... ". R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 88:9-14 (Dec. 3, 2013)) (emphasis added).
25. The REPC specifically states that "[Sun Hill] reserves the right to, at its sole
"

discretion, make changes in the plans, specifications, and materials for the Home [defined
as the lot and improvements] as and when Seller deems necessary and appropriate." R.
2047 {Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 8 & 1.3).
26. Due to the flooding, Sun Hill reasonably used the services provided by the
Natural Resources Conservation Service Division of the US Department of Agriculture to
make changes to the grading of Lot 8 and add rock armoring walls to Lot 8 in order to
protect the lot and home from future flooding. R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 23:1 - 27:25
(Dec. 3, 2013)); See Also R. 1608 at ,I29; See Also R. 1786 at ,I30.
2 7. After the pool constructed by Anthony Bros. failed, Jared Hanks, a soils
engineer, performed soils testing on the soil that the government added to Lot 8, and
during trial was asked '' ... when the soil in the backyard area of lot 8 was tested, it came
back 89 to 90 percent?" to which he responded ''[y]es". R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I,

v;

182:24- 183:2 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
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28. When Jared Hanks was asked " ... to what compaction level are backyards
usually compacted?" he responded by saying that "Landscaping is usually somewhere
from 85 to 90 percent." R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 160:17-19 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
29. Jim Nordquist, an expert for both Appellants and Sun Hill, was asked "[i]s it
customary for backyards and even front yards to be compacted by developers to - in
excess of 90 percent?" and he replied '"Not very often". R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I,
200:23-25 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
30. Mr. Nordquist testified that compacting a backyard to 95 percent or 90 percent
would be a "unique situation" and that '"it would be rare" for a developer" ... in a multiple
lot subdivision such as Woodlands [where Lot 8 is]" to compact backyards to 90 or 95
percent. See R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 201:7-18 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
Post-Closing Construction of Pool
3 1. On or about May 16, 2006, Appellant and Sun Hill "closed" on the sale of the
home and Lot 8 ("Property" or "Lot 8") and Sun Hill conveyed the Property to Appellants
by Special Warranty Deed (hereinafter "Warranty Deed") which was recorded on or about
June 6, 2006. R. 1561 (Pretrial Order, Stipulated and Uncontroverted Facts) at ,I8.
32. After the property had been deeded to Appellants by Sun Hill, Appellants hired
Anthony Bros. to construct a pool in the backyard of Lot 8 at the Woodlands (hereinafter
"Pool"). R. 1561 at ,I9.
33. Sun Hill did not construct the Pool and the Pool was constructed at the
Property after Appellants accepted title to the Property. R. 1561 at ,r 11.
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34. Appellants never had a contract with Sun Hill for Sun Hill to construct the
Pool. R. 1561 at ,I12.
35. Prior to signing their agreement with Anthony Bros. for the construction of the
Pool, Appellant John Mardesich reviewed his contract with Anthony Bros. R. 2043 (Tr.
Transcr., Vol. I, 81:15-24 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
36. In the course of reviewing his agreement with Anthony Bros. for the
construction of the Pool prior to execution of that agreement, Mr. Mardesich came across
a section of that agreement where the "homeowner ... basically guarantee[ d] that the soil
~

[in the back yard on Lot 8] was compacted to 90 percent". R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I,
81:23 - 82:2 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
37. Mr. Mardesich told Anthony Bros. that he didn't know what that guarantee
meant in the agreement with Anthony Bros. and tried to offer the soils report for the
development (R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 16)) to Anthony Bros.; the representative of Anthony Bros.
did not look at or accept a copy of the soils report from Mr. Mardesich. R. 2043 (Tr.
Transcr., Vol. I, 82:2-13 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
38. In spite of the requirements of §14 of the REPC, Appellants did not pay a
licensed engineer to complete proper engineering for the construction of the pool. See R.
2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 102:23 - 103:6 (Dec. 2, 2013)); See Also R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr.,
Vol. I, 60:23 - 61 :4 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
39. When John Mardesich was asked "[w]ho did you have do the engineering for

vJ

the pool, the spa and the fire pit and the creek?", Mr. Mardesich responded that "Hal
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Anthony" of Anthony Bros. did the engineering. See R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 102:23
- 103:6 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
40. When the Appellant John Mardesich was asked "[ d]id you believe it was your
responsibility as the homeowner to engineer the pool and the spa and the creek and -", he
responded that "[ w]ell, I believe that it was my responsibility to hire a contractor that
would engineer it, yes." See R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 103:7 - 103:10 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
41. During the construction of the pool and while the re bar was being placed in the
pool prior to the application of gunite, Jared Hanks of AGEC noticed the construction of
the swimming pool and went to Anthony Bros. to disclose potential soils conditions to the
pool contractor. See R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 159:2-25 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
42. The reason that Jared Hanks went to tell Anthony Bros., the contractor for the
pool, about the soil conditions was that he " ... had knowledge that the building pads were
only prepared to accept the building foundations and then potentially five feet outside the
building foundations." See R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 159:22-25 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
43. Mr. Hanks informed Anthony Bros. that the pool they were constructing at
Appellants' property was being constructed in an area outside of compaction and that
there could be soil issues with the pool. See R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 160:7-14 (Dec.
2, 2013)).
44. The representative of Anthony Bros. responded to Mr. Hanks that he had
engineers design the reinforcing steel in the pool, but did not engage a soils engineer
stated that" ... there were never any soil problems prior to engineers being involved." R.
2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 161 :7-17 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
18
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45. Judge Shumate found that Mr. Hanks' testimony that he alerted Anthony Bros.
to the soils issues at Lot 8 was more credible than Mr. Anthony's denial regarding those
conversations and found further that Anthony Bros. had knowledge of the issues of the
soils conditions at Lot 8 while the pool was in the steel framing stage. R. 2044 (Tr.
Transcr., Vol. II, 84:1-16 (Dec. 3, 2013)).
46. After completion of the construction of the pool by Anthony Bros., the pool
and spa experienced significant differential settlement. R. 1562 at ,I12.
Judge Shumate 's Interpretation of the REPC

47.Judge Shumate ruled that the REPC or " ... Exhibit No. 1, entered into by the
parties with all 12 addenda is in fact tlte agreement between tlte parties, that is basically
uncontroverted, and the exhibit that is in the Court's hands does and is found by the Court

"

to be a full and true and correct copy of that agreement." R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II,
87:5-10 (Dec. 3, 2013)).
48. Judge Shumate interpreted the REPC as providing Sun Hill the contractual
right to alter the grading of Lot 8 and to accept the assistance from the government R.
2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 88:9-14 (Dec. 3, 2013)) (stating that" ... by a preponderance of
the evidence that the 2005 flood changed what was contemplated by the parties when they
entered into [the REPC], and that the defendant Sun Hill Homes was required to adapt to
those changes. They adapted to those changes and had every right to do so under the
terms of this contract...".).
49. Judge Shumate then interpreted the REPC in such a way to find that "[ t]he
REPC poses a duty on Sun Hill Homes to investigate the suitability of the soil added to
19
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Lot 8 for its intended use as a buildable lot for the construction of a swimming pool." R.
1601 at ,r 3 7.
50. However, Judge Shumate found that" ... there was no bargain between the
parties with respect to what liability under Exhibit 1 [the REPC] would apply to that
change [or the addition of soil]." R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 90:18-19 (Dec. 3, 2013))
(emphasis added).
51. In finding there was no "bargain" regarding the placement of soil, Judge
Shumate stated that "[w ]here there is no specific understanding of what the contract is
mean [sic] and what the bargain is meant between the parties when this thousand year
flood or between 500 and 1,000, maybe it's a 750 year flood if there is such a thing, when
this occurred no one took the next step to say what are the different circumstances." R.
2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 91:7-12 (Dec. 3, 2013)).
52. Judge Shumate then said "[i]t may seem somewhat arbitrary for the Court to
place that risk in the hands of Sunhill [sic], but they were the ones in charge of the lot
during this period oftime." R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 91:13-15 (Dec. 3, 2013)).
53. Judge Shumate found that the parties did not have an agreement regarding the
risk of loss associated with the placement of soil at Lot 8. R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II,
91:13-15 (Dec. 3, 2013)); See Also R. 1601 at if 38.
54. Judge Shumate found that "[w ]here there is no express understanding as to the
changed circumstances, the risk associated with the placement of additional soil is placed
in the hands of Sun Hill Homes." R. 1601 at ,r 39.
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Judge Westfa/1 's Correction ofLegal Error in Judge Shumate 's Interpretation of the
REPC and determination that the parties had an agreement regarding the risk of loss
associated with the placement ofsoil at Lot 8.
55. Judge Westfall pointed out that Judge Shumate" ... made no finding that the
parties ever mutually agreed that Sun Hill would be responsible to ensure the suitability of
the soil for a swimming pool." R. 1759.
56. However, Judge Westfall found that Judge Shumate erred in finding that the
parties had not addressed the risk of loss associated with the placement of additional soil
at Lot 8. R. 1760.
57. Judge Westfall determined that "[f]ar from being silent, however, the REPC
clearly imposes on Plaintiffs the responsibility for proper engineering of an improvement
such as the swimming pool here." R. 1760 (referring to R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§
14.3)).
58. Judge Westfall also stated that" ... there does not appear to be any reasonable
basis for finding that Sun Hill had a contractual duty under the REPC to investigate the
soil's suitability for a swimming pool, particularly when section 14 of the REPC expressly
allocates to Plaintiffs the responsibility for proper engineering of improvements involving
excavation, which would include an improvement such as a swimming pool here." R.
1759.
59. Judge Westfall then said that "[i]t is unreasonable to circumvent this express
provision [section 14] by purporting to fill a void about the risk of loss associated with
VP

placement of additional soil." R. 1760.
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60. Judge Westfall ruled that " ... the Judgment should be amended to correct the

legal error that occurred when a contractual duty was imposed on Sun Hill to investigate
the suitability of the soil for a swimming pool. Absent such duty, there is no basis for
holding Sun Hill liable for breach of contract...". R. 1760 (emphasis added).

Sun Hill's Award ofAttorneys' Fees and Costs
61.

Appellants' claims against Sun Hill were based in, and founded upon, the

REPC. R. 95- I 06.
62.

Section 15.3 of the REPC provides for mandatory Arbitration 5 • See R.

2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC, at§ 15.3).
63.

Without requesting or demanding Arbitration, Appellants initiated this

action against Sun Hill after obtaining permission from the Court to amend its Complaint
to include Sun Hill. See R. 74-75; See Also R. 95-106.
64.

Sun Hill responded to the Amended Complaint by filing an Answer filed on

or about August 16, 2010. R. 112-120.
65.

By the actions of Appellants and Sun Hill in filing an Amended Complaint

and responding with an Answer without requiring Arbitration, each Party waived the

5

Appellants have not challenged the award of attorneys' fees to Sun Hill based on the
term of the REPC only permitting an award of fees in arbitration or mediation. Instead,
the Appellants only basis for arguing that Sun Hill should not be awarded fees is under
the doctrine of "first breach" where the Appellants claim that Sun Hill breached the
REPC by allowing the government to add soil and rock walls to Lot 8. This contention is
made in spite of Judge Shumate's finding that Sun Hill had every right under the contract
to accept the assistance of the government. See R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 88:9-14
(Dec. 3, 2013))
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requirement for mandatory Arbitration in accordance with section 78B-11-105(1) of the
Utah Code. See R. 95-106; See Also R. 112-120.
66.

The Appellants specifically sought fees in accordance with the contract (or

REPC) of the parties. R. 106.
67.

Sun Hill sought fees in its Answer to Appellants Amended Complaint. R.

68.

The REPC states that "[i]n the event of any arbitration or mediation

119.

between Seller and Buyer, before or after the Closing, the prevailing party shall be
entitled to an award of all attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined by the
arbitrator or mediator hearing the matter." R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at § 25).
69.

The REPC states further that "[ a]ny court or arbitration hearing any matter

on appeal may also award such fees to the prevailing party in and for any prior mediation
or arbitration." R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 25).
70.

Both parties have claimed fees in this action under the provision of the

REPC awarding attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party. See R. 1577-79; See

Also R. 1885-94.
71.

Judge Westfall ruled that" ... I don't find that there's an initial breach by

SunHill [sic]". See R. 2046 (Hrg. Transcr. 11:6-7 (June 29, 2015)).
72.

Judge Westfall stated further that "[t]hey [or Sun Hill] complied with their

contractual obligations, so their attorney fees as requested are awarded." See R. 2046
(Hrg. Transcr. 11: 18-19 (Jun. 29, 2015)).

Ill
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The REPC is the entire agreement between Appellants and Sun Hill with regard to
Lot 8. The Appellants stipulated and conceded that the REPC was both integrated and
unambiguous. Judge Shumate excluded parol evidence during trial and ruled that the
REPC was" .. .in fact the agreement of the parties ... ". R. 2047 (Tr. Transcr. Vol. II at
87:5-7 (Dec. 3, 2013)). Sun Hill approached trial and its defense at trial based on the
rulings of Judge Shumate regarding parol evidence and the integration and unambiguity
of the REPC. Judge Shumate found that there was no bargain or understanding outside of
the REPC 6 • Judge Shumate also found that the REPC permitted Sun Hill to make
changes to Lot 8 and thus permitted Sun Hill to accept the assistance of the government
to add soil and rock armoring walls to Lot 8 on the border of the Santa Clara River.
However, at the conclusion of two days of testimony, Judge Shumate then
contradicted his own findings regarding the integrated and unambiguous REPC and
found that the REPC imposed a duty on Sun Hill to investigate the soils added to Lot 8 by
the government for the suitability of a pool. In spite of the REPC imposing an explicit
duty on the Appellants to engineer improvements to Lot 8 and in spite of the homeowner
understanding that it was his duty to hire a contractor that would properly engineer the
pool 7, Judge Shumate found that the parties had been silent on the risk of loss associated
with the addition of the soil. Such a finding is an improper interpretation of the REPC
and contrary to the finding that that writing is the entire integrated agreement of the
Specifically, Judge Shumate found that with regard to the risk ofloss associated with the
addition of soil to Lot 8 the parties had no agreement.
7 See R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 103:7 - 103:10 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
6
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c...,,

parties. Judge Shumate ignored the explicit terms of the REPC and his own rulings, and
then imposed an additional implied term upon Sun Hill in order to find a purported
breach under the REPC.
Judge Westfall agreed with Judge Shumate that that REPC was the entire
agreement of the parties, but Judge Westfall properly corrected the legal error committed
by Judge Shumate. The legal error that Judge Shumate committed was that after he had
concluded that the integrated and unambiguous REPC was " ... in fact the agreement of
the parties ... " he interpreted this written contract to impose a duty on Sun Hill to
investigate the suitability of the additional soils on Lot 8 for a pool. The REPC stated
explicitly that Sun Hill was not constructing the pool at Lot 8. The REPC imposed a duty
on the Appellants to properly engineer improvements such as the pool. Judge Shumate
misinterpreted the REPC. Judge Shumate's interpretation directly contradicts the explicit
terms of the REPC. It is legal error for Judge Shumate to create contract terms that are
contradictory to the explicit bargain of the parties and which were never agreed upon by
the parties.
Judge Westfall also properly corrected another erroneous interpretation of the
REPC by Judge Shumate. Judge Shumate found that the parties had no bargain regarding
the risk of loss associated with the addition of soils at Lot 8, when the REPC did in fact
address such a risk of loss by requiring the Appellants to properly engineer
improvements. Judge Shumate' s finding that the REPC was silent on this issue was in
error because the parties had such a bargain within the four comers of the REPC. All risk
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of loss on the property was to be borne by the Appellants after closing 8 . As also noted by
Judge Westfall, "[i]t is unreasonable to circumvent this express provision [section 14,
which requires the Appellants to properly engineer improvements such as the pool] by
purporting to fill a void about the risk of loss associated with placement of additional
soil." Because of the explicit terms of the REPC, Judge Westfall found that Judge
Shumate improperly found an absence of an agreement regarding the risk of loss where in
fact there was an agreement.
It is well within the discretion of the district court under Utah R. Civ. P. 59 to
amend a judgment entered after a bench trial to correct legal error and where there is
insufficient evidence to conclude that parties did not have an agreement. Here, Judge
Westfall agreed with and adhered strictly to the findings of fact of Judge Shumate in the
context of the finding that the REPC was the only agreement of the parties. Judge
Shumate never found that the parties had a meeting of the minds outside the explicit
terms of the REPC (stating that they had no "bargain"). Judge Westfall agreed with and
adhered to this finding, but, as within his discretion, he corrected legal error regarding the
interpretation of the parties' agreement, which is the REPC.
The Appellants argue both that there was an agreement outside the REPC and that
Sun Hill did not sufficiently marshal evidence for the Rule 59 Motion. Both arguments
fail. Parol evidence was excluded and the Appellant Mardesich never testified that he
had an agreement with Sun Hill regarding the investigation of the added soil for a pool.
Further, Appellants specific Rule 59 Motion did marshal all necessary evidence and
8

See R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at 5.8).
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Judge Westfall ruled on the Rule 59 Motion after a careful review of Judge Shumate's
findings, the evidence, and a proper interpretation of the REPC.
Lastly, Sun Hill is the prevailing party and entitled to fees and costs. Sun Hill
··-JP

fulfilled its obligations under the REPC. The Appellants agreed and the Appellant
Mardesich acknowledged in his testimony that he knew that he had an obligation to
properly engineer the pool. He did not engineer the pool. The Appellants agreed to
indemnify Sun Hill under the REPC for improvements that were not properly engineered.
Instead of this, Appellants brought this action seeking redress for a failed pool that had
been constructed by a third-party after the Appellants closed on the Property. As a result,
Judge Westfall properly ruled that Sun Hill is the prevailing party and correctly awarded
Sun Hill its fees and costs. Sun Hill is also entitled to its fees and costs in defending this
Appeal.
ARGUMENT

I.

Judge Shumate and Judge Westfall both agreed that the REPC was
the entire agreement between Sun Hill and the Appellants and that
the REPC was never modified by the parties.

Judge Shumate found that the REPC was " ... in fact the agreement between the
parties ... ". R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr. Vol. II at 87:5-7 (Dec. 3, 2013)). Judge Shumate's
finding came after a stipulation and admission that the REPC was integrated and
unambiguous. R. 2042 (Hrg. Transcr. 8:24 - 9:1 (Oct. 29, 2013)); R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr.,
Vol. I, 9:8 - 10:9 (Dec. 2, 2013)). Judge Westfall accepted the same factual findings as
Judge Shumate and did not disrupt the finding of Judge Shumate that the REPC was the
entire agreement of the parties. See R. 1752, generally.
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The only claim made by Appellants against Sun Hill that remained for trial was
Appellants' breach of contract claim. R. 2042 (Hrg. Transcr. 19:15-18 (Oct. 29, 2013)).
A breach of contract claim requires ( 1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking

recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party, and (4) damages. Blair v. Axiom
Design, 2001 UT 20, ,Il4, 20 P.3d 388 (citation omitted). Here, Judge Shumate
concluded that the only agreement between the parties was the REPC. Judge Shumate
further made a factual determination that the parties did not have any additional
"bargain" or understanding outside of the REPC 9• Judge Shumate's determination came
after he had excluded parol evidence during two days of testimony and after Appellants
conceded and stipulated that the REPC was both integrated and unambiguous. 10 Judge
Westfall accepted Judge Shumate's finding that REPC is the only agreement of the
parties.
The REPC is unambiguous and integrated and requires that any modification to
the agreement of the parties be in writing and signed by both Appellants and a
representative of Sun Hill. The Supreme Courts has " ... defined an integrated agreement
as 'a writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms of an
agreement."' Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ~13, 182 P.3d 326 (citations
omitted). "To determine whether a writing is an integration, a court must determine
whether the parties adopted the writing 'as the final and complete expression of their
See R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, at 90:18-19 (Dec. 3, 2013)); See Also R. 2044 (Tr.
Transcr., Vol. II, at 91:7-12 (Dec. 3, 2013)).
10 See R. 2046 (Tr. Transcr. Vol. II at 87:5-7 (Dec. 3, 2013)); See Also R. 2042 (Hrg.
Transcr. at 8:24- 9:1 (Oct. 29, 2013)); See Also R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, at 9:24 10:4 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
9
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bargain.'" Id. Here, the REPC itself contains an integration clause and requires that any
changes or modifications be in writing and signed by both parties. R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. 1,
REPC at § 29). This aspect of the agreement was well understood by the Appellants as
they entered into twelve (12) separate addenda to the original contract that were all in
writing and signed.
Where a contract is integrated, parol evidence is only admissible to clarify
ambiguous terms and is not admissible to vary or contradict clear and unambiguous terms
of an agreement. See Tangren, 2008 UT at 'j!'j! 11-12. The Appellants conceded during
the hearing on Sun Hill's Motion for Summary Judgment that the REPC is unambiguous.
R. 2042 (Hrg. Transcr. 8:24 -9:1 (Oct. 29, 2013)). Judge Shumate excluded parol
evidence during the trial and never concluded that the REPC contained any ambiguities.
Not only did Judge Shumate not admit or allow any parol evidence about modifying the
REPC, Judge Shumate explicitly concluded that there was no additional understanding or
bargain between Appellants and Sun Hill outside of the REPC 11 •
The integrated and unambiguous REPC states that "[t]his Agreement cannot be
changed, amended, or altered without the written agreement of Buyer and Seller, which
written agreement must be signed by Buyer and an authorized representative of Seller."
R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 29) (emphasis added). The Appellants did not present any
writing at trial that was signed by either the Appellants or the Buyer which imposed a
duty on Sun Hill to investigate the suitability of soils added to Lot 8 by the government
for the suitability of a pool. There was no testimony, either admitted or countenanced by
11

See R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 90:18-19 & 91 :7-12 (Dec. 3, 2013)).

29
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Judge Shumate, that the REPC was modified 12• This body of addenda and the original
agreement are integrated and unambiguous and were never further modified to place a
burden regarding investigating the soil added by the government for the suitability of a
pool on Sun Hill. Judge Westfall reiterated that Judge Shumate did not find any_
agreement between Sun Hill and the Appellants other than the REPC when he found:
... Judge Shumate made no finding that the parties ever mutually agreed that
Sun Hill would be responsible to ensure the suitability of the soil for a
swimming pool. He only found that Sun Hill was aware of Plaintiffs'
intention to build a swimming pool in their backyard, ... and that the
absence of any agreement between the parties as to '[t]he risk ofloss
associated with the placement of as much as fifteen feet of additional soil
on Lot 8' resulted in such risk being 'placed in the hands of Sun Hill
Homes.'

R. 17 59 (emphasis in original).
In short, both Judge Shumate and Judge Westfall concluded that the REPC was "in
fact" the entire agreement of the parties. It is integrated and unambiguous and is the final
expression of the parties' entire agreement with regard to the purchase of Lot 8 from Sun
Hill.
II.

Appellants conceded, stipulated, and agreed that the REPC is
integrated and unambiguous and should now be precluded from
arguing that Sun Hill and Appellants had any other agreement.

At the hearing on Sun Hill's Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellants conceded
that the REPC was unambiguous by stating " ... this is undisputed, and both parties agree
that the REP-C [sic] is unambiguous." R. 2042 (Hrg. Transcr. at 8:24 - 9: 1 (Oct. 29,

The Appellants and Sun Hill executed twelve ( 12) written addenda to the REPC
changing or modifying certain terms contained in the original contract, but none of these
addenda addressed the addition of the soil to Lot 8.
12
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2013)). During trial, counsel for Sun Hill objected to parol evidence. Counsel for
Appellants were then asked by Judge Shumate "[ c]ounsel, is there some ambiguity in the
contract that would justify the Court looking at the parol in any way, shape, or form?";
and counsel for Appellants responded that "[y]our Honor, as far as the integration in the
contract, there isn't, although that's not where I'm going with this." R. 2043 (Tr.
Transcr., Vol. I, at 9:24 - 10:4 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
Because of this stipulation and concession that the REPC was both integrated and
unambiguous, together with Judge Shumate's exclusion of parol evidence, Sun Hill
proceeded at trial with evidence and witnesses based on the need to remain within the
four comers of the REPC. Now, in contradiction to Judge Shumate's rulings and
Appellants stipulation and concessions, Appellants try to argue that there is an agreement
between the parties other than the REPC. Such an argument should be precluded by this
Court based on the rulings and stipulation and admissions at Judge Westfall. See State v.

Santonio, 2011 UT App 385, ~29, 265 P.3d 822 (stating that "trial courts [are not
required] to imagine all reasonable offshoots of the argument actually presented to them
before making a ruling .... [and citing another case that] explain[s] that the preservation
rule prevents parties not only from raising new issues on appeal, but also from raising
new arguments on appeal) (citations omitted)). Here, the Appellants and Sun Hill tried
this case as a contract case based on a written agreement which Appellants conceded and
stipulated that it was integrated and unambiguous. Allowing them to now argue that
there is another agreement between the parties would be improper and would allow new
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arguments that are not supported by the evidence and which are wholly inconsistent with
Appellants trial position.

III.

Judge Westfall properly concluded that the REPC imposes a
contractual obligation on the Appellants to "properly engineer"
improvements such as the pool constructed by Anthony Bros and
that Appellants failed to perform this obligation.

Regardless of the compaction of the soils added to Lot 8 by the government 13, the
REPC imposed a duty on the Appellants to properly engineer the pool constructed by
Anthony Bros. The REPC explicitly states that the Appellants" ... hereby agrees to
correctly engineer all such future improvements [including excavation work]". R. 2047
(Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 14). The Appellant John Mardesich testified that he" ... believe[d]
that it was [his] responsibility to hire a contractor that would engineer [the pool], yes.''
See R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, l 03 :7 - 103: IO (Dec. 2, 2013)). In spite of the explicit

requirement of the REPC for all excavation at the Property to be properly engineered, the
pool was not properly engineered and the pool settled.
Judge Shumate found that the REPC was silent with regard to the risk of loss
associated with the addition of soil to Lot 8. However, Judge Westfall correctly
interpreted the REPC to find that the REPC was not silent with regard to that risk of loss.

There was no evidence at trial that the soil added by the government to Lot 8 did not
meet industry standards. When the expert Jared Hanks was asked " ... when the soil in the
backyard area of lot 8 was tested, it came back 89 to 90 percent?", he responded "[y]es".
R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 182:24- 183:2 (Dec. 2, 2013)). When Mr. Hanks was
asked" ... to what compaction level are backyards usually compacted?" he responded by
saying that "Landscaping is usually somewhere from 85 to 90 percent." R. 2043 (Tr.
Transcr., Vol. I, 160:17-19 (Dec. 2, 2013)). The expert witness Jim Nordquist regarding
backyard fill was that backyards are often compacted less than 90%. R. 2043 (Tr.
Transcr., Vol. I, 200:23-25 Dec. 2, 2013)).
'3
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Instead, Judge Westfall found, the REPC is "far from being silent" and does impose on
Appellants the duty for proper engineering of an improvement such as the swimming
pool. R. 1760. Judge Westfall also concluded that it is " ... unreasonable to c~rcumvent
this express provision by purporting to fill a void about the risk of loss associated with
the placement of additional soil." R. 1760.
As stated above, a breach of contract claim requires performance by the party
seeking recovery. Blair, 2001 UT at 114 (citation omitted). Here, it is uncontroverted
that the Appellants failed to properly engineer the pool for the soils at Lot 8. It is
uncontroverted that the Appellant knew that it was his obligation to hire someone to
properly engineer the pool. Yet, in spite of the explicit contractual requirements, and the
Appellant's knowledge of this requirement, the pool was not properly engineered 14 • As
such, there is a breach by the Appellant of the REPC requiring that improvements, such
as the pool, be "properly engineered'~. Due to this breach, the Appellants cannot and did
not meet the second element of a breach of contract claim requiring "performance by
party seeking recovery." Blair, 2001 UT at P14. Judge Westfall correctly found that this
contractual obligation regarding engineering the pool placed the risk of loss on the
Appellants and ruled in Sun Hill's favor.

Ill
Ill
Ill
14

Anthony Bros. was put on notice of the soil conditions and potential lack of
compaction, and yet Anthony Bros. disregarded such information and failed to properly
engineer the pool for such soil conditions.
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IV.

Judge Westfall properly concluded that the REPC does not impose
a duty on Sun Hill to investigate the suitability of the soil added to
Lot 8 for a pool.

After finding that the REPC was the agreement of the parties and concluding that
there was no other agreement between the Appellants and Sun Hill, Judge Shumate stated
that:
[i]t's the Court's position that the reasonable interpretation of the contract,
the REP-C [sic], Exhibit 1, would impose a duty upon Sunhill [sic] to make
investigation as to the utility of this additional buildable area on the lot
because this was a different lot than they bound themselves under the
contract and placed the burden, the risk of loss that might arise on that
when the lot changed. . .. [i]t may seem somewhat arbitrary for the Court to
place that risk in the hands of Sunhill [sic], but they were the ones in charge
of the lot during this period of time."

~

~

R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 90:6-12 & 91:13-15 (Dec. 3, 2013)).
As pointed out by Judge Westfall, a " ... court can only supply reasonable [impliedin-law] terms to supplement a contract which is silent." R. 1760 (citing Ross v. Epic

Eng'g, PC, 2013 UT App 136,114 n.4, 307 P.3d 576 (add'l citations omitted)) (emphasis
added). Judge Shumate found that the REPC was silent regarding the risk of loss
associated with the additional soil the government placed on Lot 8. However, Judge
Shumate found that the parties never mutually agreed to any specific terms regarding the
placement of the soil. As such, Judge Shumate found that the REPC contained impliedat-law terms instead of mutually agreed upon terms 15•

If Judge Shumate concluded that the REPC does impose a duty on Sun Hill to
investigate the suitability of the soil for a pool based on some statements of the parties
and not through implied-at-law terms in the REPC, then the trial judge improperly relied
on parol evidence that he excluded during the trial. See Garrett v. Ellison, 93 Utah 184,
188, 72 P.2d 449 (Utah 1937) (stating that "Parol evidence is inadmissible to vary, alter,
15
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l:i...

Judge Westfall corrected the error of Judge Shumate by pointing out that the
REPC was not silent on the risk of loss associated with additional soil placed on Lot 8 by
the government. Judge Westfall found instead that the REPC imposed an explicit duty on
the Appellants to engineer the pool that they chose to have Anthony Bros. construct at
Lot 8. Here, Judge Westfall concluded that Judge Shumate never found that the parties
ever mutually agreed that Sun Hill would be responsible to ensure the suitability of the
soil for a swimming pool. R. 1759. Judge Westfall pointed out that Judge Shumate only
found that the parties did not have an agreement regarding the investigation of the
suitability of the soil for a pool.
This finding by Judge Westfall regarding Judge Shumate's finding is wholly
consistent with the trial transcripts and the written judgment of Judge Shumate. Judge
Shumate ruled that the REPC " ... is in fact the agreement between the parties, that is
basically uncontroverted ... ". R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 87:5-10 (Dec. 3, 2013)).
Judge Shumate found that" ... there was no bargain between the parties with respect to
what liability under Exhibit 1 [the REPC] would apply to that change [or the addition of
soil]." R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 90:18-19 (Dec. 3, 2013)) (emphasis added). In
finding there was no "bargain" regarding the placement of soil, Judge Shumate stated that
"[w]here there is no specific understanding of what the contract is mean [sic] and what
the bargain is meant between the parties when this thousand year flood or between 500
and 1,000, maybe it's a 750 year flood if there is such a thing, when this occurred no one

control, or contradict the terms of a written instrument, in an action founded upon such
writing, between the parties or privies thereto.").
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took the next step to say what are the different circumstances." R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr.,
Vol. II, 91 :7-12 (Dec. 3, 2013)). Judge Shumate concluded that H ••• the 2005 flood
changed what was contemplated by the parties when they entered into [the REPC], and
that the defendant Sun Hill Homes was required to adapt to those changes. They adapted
to those changes and had every right to do so under the terms of this contract ... ". R.
2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 88:9-14 (Dec. 3, 2013)) (emphasis added).
Judge Shumate found that "[ w]here there is no express understanding as to the
changed circumstances, the risk associated with the placement of additional soil is placed
in the hands of Sun Hill Homes." R. 1601, at 139. Thus, Judge Shumate imposed
"implied-at-law" terms into the REPC. Judge Shumate erred in concluding that the
REPC was in fact silent on this issue of the added soils. First, the REPC did address risk
of loss and placed it squarely on the Appellants in section 5.8 of the REPC. Second, the
REPC required the Appellants to properly engineer "[t]uture improvements", such as a
pool, under section 14.3. Third, the Appellant acknowledged in his own testimony that
he knew he had the obligation to have the pool engineered. Because of the explicit terms
of the REPC, which Appellant knew and understood, finding that the REPC is silent on
the risk of loss regarding the soil fails to acknowledge the actual written agreement of the
parties and is in error. As such, Judge Westfall did not abuse his discretion in finding
that Judge Shumate erred by concluding that the integrated and unambiguous agreement
of the parties did not address the risk of loss associated with a pool that was constructed
by Anthony Bros. and which was not properly engineered. Judge Westfall' s ruling in
correcting the error of Judge Shumate with regard to the implied-at-law terms is
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reasonable given the other rulings of Judge Shumate regarding the integration and
completeness of the REPC as the parties' agreement. See Smith, 2003 UT at ,25 (stating
that "we will reverse only if there is no reasonable basis for the [Rule 59] decision."
(citation omitted).
V.

There is no factual basis for Appellants' argument that there was
an agreement between the parties regarding the use of the backyard
as a "buildable area"; such an argument requires an improper
modification of the REPC.

Appellants state in their Brief, at statement of fact number 28, that "[p]ursuant to
conversations between Mr. Mardesich and Sun Hill's agent, Mr. Roger Stratford, it was
agreed and understood that the level portion of the back yard area was increased and that
the entire level portion of the backyard area was able to be used as a buildable area."
Brief of Appellant, p. 9, Statement of Fact 28. This statement incorrectly characterizes
the testimony of the Appellant and the record. The part of the transcript that Appellant
cites to support this "statement of fact" actually states: "[s]o after that discussion with
Roger Stratford, was it your understanding that the entire level portion of your yard
would be able to be used as buildable area for backyard improvements?" To which, Mr.
Mardesich responded "Yes.". R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr. Vol. I, 54:17-21 (Dec. 2, 2013)).
Mr. Mardesich does not actually state that it was "agreed and understood" and
never actually testified that he had any agreement with Sun Hill other than the REPC.
Mr. Mardesich never testified that he had a verbal agreement with Sun Hill regarding the
suitability of the soil in the backyard for a pool or a verbal modification of the REPC.
His understanding that the area where the soil had been added could be used for
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improvements does not support a conclusion that there ever was a meeting of the minds
between him and Sun Hill regarding the imposition of a duty on Sun Hill to investigate
the suitability of the soils. Indeed, if Mr. Mardesich had attempted to testify that he had
verbal discussions with Sun Hill regarding an agreement of the parties other than the
REPC or verbal discussion that altered the REPC, counsel for Sun Hill would have
objected as to parol evidence and, based on the prior ruling of Judge Shumate, such
testimony would have been excluded.
The REPC requires that "[t]his Agreement cannot be changed, amended, or altered
without the written agreement of Buyer and Seller~ which written agreement must be
signed by Buyer and an authorized representative of Seller." R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at

§ 29). Under the Statute of Frauds, "[ e]very contract for the leasing for a longer period
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless
the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party
by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in
writing." U.C.A. § 25-5-3. Here, the Appellants understood that all changes to the
REPC had to be in writing and signed as is evidence by the twelve (12) addenda executed
by the Appellants for Lot 8. See R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC, generally).
Further, it is unreasonable that the Appellant believed that the REPC had been
modified to impose the duty of ensuring the suitability of the added soil upon Sun Hill
because the Appellant himself testified that "[he] believe[ d] that it was [his]
responsibility to hire a contractor that would engineer [the pool], yes." See R. 2043 (Tr.
Transcr., Vol. I, 103:7 - 103:10 (Dec. 2, 2013)). Appellants brief fails to capture the
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actual testimony, tenor, and findings during trial. Judge Shumate did not conclude that
there was any agreement other than the REPC. As such, there is no agreement between
Appellants and Sun Hill other than the REPC and there is no factual or legal basis for
finding such an agreement.

VI.

Appellants' argument that Sun Hill did not properly marshal
evidence 16 for its Rule 59 Motion fails to recognize the nature of Sun
Hill's Rule 59 Motion.

Appellants attempts to argue that Sun Hill has failed to properly marshal the
evidence in its Motion for New Trial. Appellants cites to Harris v. JES Assocs. to support
their argument. 2003 UT App 112, 69 P.3d 297. However, Appellants have
misunderstood the tenor of this case, the evidence needing to be marshaled, and the
evidence actually marshaled. Harris states that "[i]n order to properly discharge the duty
of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very
findings the appellant resists." 2003 UT App at 139 (emphasis added).

The Rule 59 Motion was based on Sun Hill resisting very specific findings of
Judge Shumate. Sun Hill resisted the contradictory findings of Judge Shumate that (a) on
the one hand the REPC is integrated and unambiguous and the agreement of the parties,
and (b) on the other hand that Judge Shumate inserted a contradictory term that he said

16

Appellants have argued that Sun Hill failed to marshal evidence. However, Appellants
now challenge the finding of Judge Shumate that there was no meeting of the minds or
bargain outside of the REPC and yet Appellants fail to marshal all evidence in support of
Judge Shumate's conclusion.
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did not exist in the agreement 17 • In addition, Sun Hill resisted the contradictory findings
that (c) on the one hand Anthony Bros. knew of possible soil problems with the
Appellants' backyard and was the contractor that actually constructed the pool that
ultimately failed and (d) on the other hand awardingjoint and several liability against Sun
Hill 18• With regard to these specific contradictory findings, Sun Hill did marshal all
necessary evidence.
During the proceedings, Judge Shumate ruled that the REPC was integrated and
unambiguous and Appellants conceded and stipulated the same. As a result, Sun Hill
presented a case based on the explicit terms of the REPC. Had Judge Shumate ruled
during the trial that the REPC was ambiguous or that it was not integrated, then Sun Hill
would have presented a very different case at trial including presenting additional
testimony regarding evidence outside the four comers of the REPC. But this was not the
finding of Judge Shumate and Sun Hill did not challenge Judge Shumate's ruling that the
REPC was integrated and unambiguous in its Rule 59 Motion. On the contrary, Sun Hill
agrees with the Court's ruling that the REPC was integrated and unambiguous and "in
fact the agreement" of the parties. As a result, Sun Hill need not cull through every scrap
of evidence that could point to an ambiguity in the contract or that it was not integrated.
Because Sun Hill is not challenging the ruling of Judge Shumate that the REPC is
Specifically, Judge Shumate added a term to the REPC that Sun Hill had to ensure the
suitability of the backyard for a pool even though the REPC was silent with regard to any
obligation with regard to a pool, clearly provided Sun Hill the opportunity to change the
lot specifications and plans, and required the Appellants to engineer the pool.
18 Judge Westfall's ruling renders the latter portion of the Rule 59 Motion regarding joint
and several liability moot, but the issue was raised, briefed, and properly marshalled in
the district court.
17
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integrated and unambiguous and the agreement of the parties, Sun Hill need not marshal
evidence that would contradict this ruling.
However, Sun Hill did challenge Judge Shumate's ruling that the REPC was silent
as to the obligations of the parties as it related to the additional soil and the requirement
to engineer improvements. Because the REPC is integrated and unambiguous, it may be
interpreted as a matter oflaw. See Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985)
(stating that "[a] contract's interpretation may be either a question of law, determined by
the words of the agreement, or a question of fact, determined by extrinsic evidence of
intent." (citation omitted)). Judge Shumate' s addition of a term to the agreement
appeared to be based on some reliance on parol evidence or, as Judge Westfall pointed
out, based on an implied-at-law term. The REPC is not silent or ambiguous on the risk of
loss associated with the pool constructed by Anthony Bros. and thus any additional term
added by Judge Shumate is in error. Sun Hill properly marshalled evidence and Judge
Westfall ruled accordingly.
VII.

Sun Hill is entitled to its fees and costs in defending this action and
this appeal.

"In Utah, attorney fees may be awarded 'if authorized by statute or by contract."'

Crowley v. Black, 2007 UT App 245,112, 167 P.3d 1087 (citing Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). Here, the REPC provides the following:
In the event of any arbitration or mediation between Seller and Buyer,
before or after the Closing, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award
of all attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined by the
arbitrator or mediator hearing the matter. Any court or arbitration hearing
any matter on appeal may also award such fees to the prevailing party in
and for any prior mediation or arbitration.
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R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 25).
The Appellants initiated legal action and waived the mandatory arbitration
provision of the REPC. See U.C.A. § 78B-1 l-105 (authorizing waiver of mandatory
arbitration). In addition, both Appellants and Sun Hill have sought their fees in this
action and the Appellants have not argued that fees are not appropriate because this
matter was litigated instead of arbitrated. Judge Westfall determined that Sun Hill is the
prevailing party and awarded Sun Hill its reasonable fees 19• "In certain circumstances, a
court may easily determine which party is the prevailing party. For example, '[w]here a
plaintiff sues for money damages, and plaintiff wins, plaintiff is the prevailing party; if
defendant successfully defends and avoids adverse judgment, defendant has prevailed."'

Crowley v. Black, 2007 UT App 245,112, 167 P.3d 1087 (citingR.T. Nielson Co. v.
Cook, 2002 UT 11, ,23, 40 P.3d 1119).
Appellants sued Sun Hill and the only claim of Appellant against Sun Hill that
remained for trial was Appellants breach of contract claim. Sun Hill, as the defendant,
successfully avoided an adverse judgment. As such, under Crowley and R. T. Nielson,
Sun Hill is the prevailing party and entitled to its fees. Appellants contend that Sun Hill
breached the REPC first. This is not the case. Judge Shumate found that Sun Hill
modified the lot " ... and had every right to do so under the terms of this contract". R.
2044 (Tr. Transcr. 88:12-15). Judge Westfall found that the Appellants actually breached
their obligations under section 14 of the REPC by failing to have the pool properly
Appellants did not challenge the reasonableness of the fees and costs of Sun Hill. See
R. 1939.
19
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engineered. As such, there is no breach by Sun Hill under Blair because there was not
performance by Appellants. Sun Hill prevailed and is entitled to its attorneys' fees and
costs accrued in trying this case.
In addition, because the REPC explicitly states that "[a]ny court or arbitration
hearing any matter on appeal may also award such fees to the prevailing party in and for
any prior mediation or arbitration," Sun Hill is entitled to all of its fees in defending this
appeal. See R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at § 25).
CONCLUSION
Judge Shumate never found that the REPC had been modified. Judge Shumate
found that Sun Hill had every right under the REPC to accept the assistance of the
government to add soil and rock walls to Lot 8 to armor and protect it from future
flooding. Judge Shumate found that the parties did not have any other agreement,
bargain, or understanding regarding Lot 8. Judge Shumate then erred by inferring that
there was an implied term in the REPC that did impose a duty on Sun Hill to investigate
the added soil for the suitability of that soil for a pool. Judge Westfall corrected this error
and ruled that the REPC was '"far from silent" on this issue and instead clearly imposed a
duty on Appellants to properly engineer the pool, which they did not. Judge Westfall
corrected the legal error of Judge Shumate and ruled that the REPC did not impose a duty
'..JD

on Sun Hill to investigate the soils for suitability of the pool and that therefore, Sun Hill
had not breached the REPC. Because of this, Judge Westfall ruled that Sun Hill was the
prevailing party and properly awarded attorneys' fees and costs to Sun Hill. For the
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foregoing reasons, the appeal should be dismissed and the district's court judgment
against Appellants upheld.

/},ttf;

DATED this .k2- day of April, 2016.
DUNN LAW FIRM

LIFFORD V. DUNN
ADAMC.DUNN
Attorneys for Appellee Sun Hill Homes
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Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action
tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered,
take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make
new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding
on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination
by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the
affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(a)(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than
14 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made
under Subdivision (a)(1 ), (2), (3), or (4 ), it shall be supported by affidavit.
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served
with the motion. The opposing party has 14 days after such service within which
to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing
affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not
exceeding 21 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by
written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
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{d) On initiative of court. Not later than 14 days after entry of judgment the
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might
have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the
grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 14 days after entry of the judgment.
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testimony that Sunhill presents is that at some point prior to

2

closing on this lot they had the backyard graded to plan.

3

Mr, Dunn referenced that Mr. Mardesich said it was graded to

4

plan.

5

it had a steeper slope.

6

this, and wouldn't have known whether that was consistent with

7

the plan or not.

.
..J)

8
9

I

l

He said

He had never seen the plan prior to

That brings us back to the issue when this case started
out, your Honor, it started out as a well, you didn't compact the

10

backyard to 90 percent, which according to all these different

11

documents, there's n.o area within the site -- and it's important

12

to recognize that while the -- while Sunhill asserts that this

13

investigation by AGEC in 2004 was limited only to the building

14

pads, the report itself on page 3 says, "A field investigation

15

was conducted on the subject site to obtain information on the

16

subsurface conditions and obtain samples for laboratory testing.n

17

Figure 2 is the site plan for that investigation, and that

18

includes all of the lots 1 through 17.

19

VP

I believe that's inconsistent with his affidavit.

So I believe that the -- to narrowly classify this as

20

an investigation only to the building lots may have been what

21

Sunhill thought it was, but according to the language within the

22

report itself, it's not so limited.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. SPENDLOVE:

25

It's a broader thing.

More than just the building footprint.
Correct, because the REP-C itself -- and

this is undisputed, and both parties agree that the REP-C is
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unambiguous.

2

as the lot and the improvements, and that's a quote out of -- I

3

had it here, but I kind of don't have it in front of me right

4

now, but both parties have cited the same language stating that

5

that is what was done.

The REP-C itself refers to the home or the property

6

So when this started, it was an issue of well, all these

7

reports say you didn't compact the soil in the backyard to the 90

8

percent like you were supposed to.

9

of well, the REP-C doesn't refer to a swimming pool.

Defendants make a big issue
Plaintiffs

10

have never said that it did.

11

is the same, the subgrade recornpaction for the fill,

12

to AGEC, needed to be to 90 percent.

13

according to Rosenberg, needed to be to 90 percent, and to build

14

the pool it needed to bo to 90 percent.

15

or unhappy, it's a coincidence that that number is the same.

16

THE COORT:

It just so happens that 90 percent
according

The site grading fill,

It's just whether happy

Counsel, what do you want to tell me about

17

what Mr. Dunn referred to, and that's an apparent shifting of

18

responsibilities and liabilities from buyer to -- or seller to

19

buyer for anything that isn't the house.

20

he's taking.

That's the position

How do you read that language?

21

MR. SPENDLOVE:

22

because it's not just the house.

23

both the lot and the .improvements on it, and so the lot is

24

required to comply with the building plan.

25

the

--

Your Honor, I don't believe that's true
As I said, the REP-C refers to

As I was getting to,

we originally thought it was just a compaction issue, but
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has the ability to recognize undisputed facts.

2

Court to do that so as to minimize any length of trial.

3

a significant number of facts which are undisputed between the

4

parties, and simply

5

T!IE COURT:

There's

And whether those facts are undisputed,

6

Counsel, that would be part of a pre-trial order.

7

sure that the finder of fact is not swamped with a tidal wave

8

when really we have a fairly good sized swimming pool

9

(inaudible).

10

~1

We would ask the

All right.

MR. SPENDLOVE:

Just making

Thank you.
Your Honor, if you have any other

11

questions in regards to that, as I said, the basis for this is

12

like I said, clarify there's a difference between structural fill

13

and subgrade fill.

14

also Sunhill had the obligation to hand this lot and house -- not

15

just the house -- over in its appropriate condition, and they did

16

not.

17

Sunhill Homes hasn't recognized that, and

THE COURT:

Okay.

I appreciate that.

Mr. Dunn, I'm

18

going to grant your motion for summary judgment as to the

19

material non-disclosure and intentional fraud claims, and also as

20

to the breach of good faith and fair dealing, but the contract

21

claims made by plaintiffs survive.

22

Mr. Berrett, let's give you a chance to talk with your side of

23

it.

Those will still be there.

~

I

~'

Go right.ahead, Counsel.

24

MR. BERRETT:

25

THE COURT:

I'll pull up your memorandum here.

If not, I've got a copy here.
I've got it right here in the database,

I

ul
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THF. COURT:

2

MR. SPENDLOVE:

3

THE COURT:

4

And it ain't moving.
It's (inaudible) okay.

Yes.

I have full right, title and interest
Nobody is going to contest it.

of that one right there.

5

MR. SPENDLOVE:

6

THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

If it goes, heads will roll.

So it will be

7

here.

8

some time to come in and work with the interface and make sure

9

you understand how the programs operate to get it up on the

Feel free to contact the clerk's office so you can get

10

screen for your witnesses.

11

as far as the pre-trial issues?

12
13

MR. DUNN:

Mr. Dunn?

Yes, your Honor.

I understood your ruling.

There also is a claim from the plaintiff of unjust enrichment.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. DUNN:

16

breach of contract.

17

THE COURT:

18

Anything else the Court can help with

That's gone, too, Counsel.
Okay.

So we're faced with just the claim of

It's a breach of contract case.

That's the

way I see it.

19

MR. DUNN:

20

THE COUR'r:

21

typing.

22

December 2.

Thank you, your Honor.
Gentlemen, I'll let you go ahead and do the

Let's get it put together and be ready for trial on
Thank you.

23

MR. DUNN:

24

MR. Sl?ENDLOVE:

25

THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.
Thank you,

your Honor.

We'll be in recess.
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1

rule from the bench,

2

(Noon recess)

3

COURT BAILIFF:

4

in session.

5

All rise.

The Court will now continue

You may be seated.

THE COURT:

Thank you, everyone.

We're back on the

6

record in Mardesich vs. Anthony Brothers Construction and Sunhill

7

Homes.

8

having reviewed the evidence, both the testimonial evidence as

9

well as the written documents is prepared to make findings of

10

The Court having heard the testimony of the parties and

fact.

11

Counsel, we will rely on first and foremost as findings

12

of fact those uncontroverted facts that are contained within the

13

Court's pre-trial order signed on the 29 th of November of 2013.

14

Paragraphs 1 through 15 are included in the Court's findings of

15

fact,

16

concentrate first on the issue between plaintiffs and Anthony

17

Brothers Construction.

18

and in my analysis and ruling from the bench,

I will

The Court finds specifically that at the time that

19

Mr. Mardesich contacted Dave from Anthony Brothers Construction,

20

he had in his possession the soils report, which has been

21

received in evidence, and that he offered that to Anthony

22

Brothers representative, but it was not accepted by Anthony

23

Brothers for any purpose.

24

25

The Court finds that at that time Anthony Brothers was
placed on notice that there were soils issues with respect to
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this building site.

2

in its steel framing stage -- and when I say steel framing,

3

should be more specific, the rebar stage before gunite was

4

installed,

5

it wrong, AGEC, noticed the site and went to Anthony Brothers

6

representatives on site and again disclosed to them the issues of

7

the soils conditions and his knowledge of the soils reports and

8

those concerns.

9

The Court also finds that while the pool was

that Mr. Hanks then of ACEG -- AGEC,

Yeah,

I

I've got

I find these by the requisite burden of proof, and so

10

that you know, Mr, Anthony, the Court has the responsibility of

11

weighing the testimony of the witnesses.

12

only the slightest tilting of those scales of justice, I make the

13

findings accordingly here,

14

burden of proof is required,

15

evidence,

16

am by yours, Mr. Anthony.

17

If I am convinced by

This is not a case where a serious
but only a preponderance of the

and I am more convinced by Mr, Hanks's testimony than I

The same general timing goes to the allegation that

18

Mr. Mardesich made representations that the lot was quote,

19

•pool ready,n close quote.

20

Mr, Mardesich made such a statement in his interactions with

21

Anthony Brothers.

22

I simply am not persuaded that

There is a provision within the Anthony Brothers

23

contract, which has been received and which the Court has as

24

Exhibit No.

25

of a one year time period in which the action on this contract

31 that purports to create a statute of limitations
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1

must be brought,

2

Brothers argues, not persuaded by the preponderance of the

3

evidence that this action was filed outside of the one year

4

limitation contained within the contract.

5

However, the court is not persuaded as Anthony

In addition, I'll just note this parenthetically.

It's

6

not necessary for the Court's decision, but the Court isn't very

7

certain that such a limited statute of limitations built within a

8

contract is necessarily favored by public policy concerns.

9

The Court is also persuaded by the evidence and the

10

testimony of the experts, the expert report, that while as

11

Anthony Brothers accurately points out that at the time of the

12

preparation of the report that the slippage on the swimming pool

13

was only 1.2 inches, and at 1 inch is within industry standards,

14

as testified to by the expert.

15

The Court is persuaded that at the time of the expert

16

report was prepared that there was that much slippage, but the

17

Court is also equally persuaded that the potential for continued

18

motion and continued movement is more than likely, and that

19

certainly the spa has tilted out of the industry standard of 1

20

inch,

21

inches on the pool.

22

it haven't settled by 1.9 inches as opposed to the only 1.2

The other issue that bears on the statute of limitations

23

clause in the Anthony Brothers contract is the circumstance in

24

which the Court finds that Mr. Mardesich did indeed attempt to

25

contact Anthony Brothers regarding his concerns with this matter
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at least 60 times without response, and that Anthony Brothers

2

only came on one occasion to address the issues with respect to

3

the creek installed and the multiple cracks in the creek, and for

4

the period of those calls being made and no response, it would be

5

appropriate and certainly within the powers of this court to find

6

that the statute of limitations built into the contract would be

7

tolled during the period of time that Mr. Mardesich was unable to

8

reach Anthony Pools.

9

Now the issue of damages is fairly clear to the Court as

10

a result of the Court's findings and the breach of the Anthony

11

Brothers contract by Anthony Brothers in numerous ways.

12

point out that those ways are specifically enumerated in Exhibit

13

16 and the testimony of Mr. Mardesich.

14

contract in its specifications sheet specifies the three 2-

15

horsepower pumps to be installed, and the Court is persuaded by

16

the necessary burden of proof that only two 1-horsepower pumps

17

no,

18

installed, and apparently the 1-horsepower pump was more powerful

19

than the pool installation would accommodate, and that had to be

20

replaced by an even smaller pump, so there is another breach of

21

the contract there.

22

persuasively outlined in Exhibit No. 15.

23

I would

Anthony Brothers's

one 2-horsepower pump and two l-horsepower pumps were

The other breaches of the contract are

Based upon the breach, the judgment is for $179,000

24

together with interest at the statutory rate of 10 percent from

25

and after the date of filing of suit, Counsel.

That's the best
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high water mark I can find because the date of the contract is

2

unclear,

3

unclear, but we can certainly grant judgment with interest

4

thereon from the date of filing this action,

5

the precise dates of the appearance of the damage is

Now with respect to Sunhill Homes,

the Court finds that

6

the contract, Exhibit No, 1, entered into by the parties with all

7

12 addenda is in fact the agreement between the parties, that is

8

basically uncontroverted,

9

hands does and is found by the Court to be a full and true and

10
11

and the exhibit that is in the Court's

correct copy of that agreement,
Exhibit No,

29 offered by Sunhill Homes as the buyer's

12

limited warranty statement appended to Exhibit No.

13

referenced in Exhibit No. 1, the Court is not persuaded by the

14

requisite burden of proof that Defendant's Exhibit No.

15

a part of this contract.

16

import did not have better record keeping,

17

such a limited warranty statement was prepared and used at the

18

closing of this transaction, but without the actual document,

19

burden of proof would lie with Sunhill to try to find this

20

apportion of the binding agreement,

21

that it is.

22

1 and

9

29 is

It is unfortunate that matters of this

I do note that Exhibit No.

It may well be that

the

and I'm simply not persuaded

29 bears with it an actual

23

signature line for the buyers on the 14 th page of the document,

24

and if we had that it would be no question about what we have

25

here as we clearly have the real estate purchase contract for
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1

construction, Exhibit No. 1.

2

The factual circumstance that makes this case so

3

difficult and required it to come to trial is that at the time

4

that lot 8 was subdivided and improved and extra excavated for

5

this project, the Court finds that it was exactly and precisely

6

done as the grading plan, Exhibit No. 7,

7

outlines.

I am persuaded by the testimony of both Mr. Mardesich

8

and Mr.

9

the home was built to that grading spec.

Rogers and all the parties' positions in this matter that
The Court does find by

10

a preponderance of the evidence that the 2005 flood changed what

11

was contemplated by the parties when they entered into Exhibit

12

No.

13

to those changes.

14

right to do so under the terms of this contract, as was argued by

15

Mr. Dunn.

1, and that the defendant Sunhill Homes was required to adapt
They adapted to those changes and had every

16

In the circumstance where they very reasonably used

17

the services offered to them after the flood by the National

18

Resources people from the Department of Agriculture to build the

19

riprap,

20

that's where the remaining portions of the

21

buildable area of the lot were added on.

22

impressed by Mr. Rogers's calculation and testimony and

23

description that every linear foot of the back lot line created

24

27 yards of material that had to be moved,

25

and it's fairly clear by inference that in the process
let's call it
The Court was most

Mr. Mardesich's photographs in Exhibit 5 -- I'm sorry,
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Exhibit 6, all three of those photographs show not only the

2

placement of the riprap,

3

that process,

4

specifically that this was done while the lot was under the sole

5

control of Sunhill Homes.

6

but the substantial bank built up in

adding to the back of the home.

The Court finds

Now the Court also finds that Sunhill was completely

7

aware through all of its agents,

8

and also through our chief executive officer --

9

MR.

10

DUNN:

THE COURT:

that its realtor,

Ms. Campbell,

Roger Stratford.
Mr. Stratford -- thank you, Counsel -- Roger

11

Stratford that it was in fact Mr. and Mrs. Mardesich's intention

12

to build a pool on this lot.

13

preponderance of the evidence that the additional soil on the end

14

of the lot changed the plans on the part of the Mardesiches.

15

order to put their pool in they had contemplated an infinity

16

style pool that did not have a hard edge all the way around it.

17

When they found that they had more real estate within which to

18

work,

19

style of pool.

The Court is also persuaded by a

In

the reasonable position to take was to go with a different

20

I honestly don't know if there's a difference in

21

expense,

22

the way that an infinity edge works on a pool,

23

would be quieter would be advantageous to some people.

24

quiet,

25

It's just that it changed.

No one testified to me about that,

but understanding
having one that
I like

but I'm not going to impose my judgment on the parties.
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When it did change,

there is no evidence that any action

2

was taken on the part of Sunhill to investigate the change in

3

this lot from the condition it was in at the time it was sold

4

when Exhibit No.

5

into.

6

1 was entered into and the REP-C was entered

It's the Court's position that the reasonable

7

interpretation of the contract,

8

impose a duty upon Sunhill Homes to make investigation as to the

9

utility of this additional buildable area on the lot because this

the REP-C,

Exhibit 1,

would

10

was a different lot than they had bound themselves under the

11

contract and placed the burden,

12

on that when the lot changed.

13

came from the addition of what may have been as many as 15 feet

14

of additional depth and soil because Mr.

15

uncompacted soil as much as 15 feet deep does impress the Court

16

at least that there is potential of that much additional soil

17

having been moved in the remediation project from the 2005 flood,

18

but there was no bargain between the parties with respect to what

19

liability under Exhibit 1 would apply to that change.

20

the risk of loss that might arise
This particular risk of loss that

Hanks's study of

The soils reports were exchanged.

The admonition from

21

the sales staff and Mr.

22

need to be looked at,

23

open to the sad regret of everyone involved in the project.

24

one stopped to say what do we do about this?

25

Stafford as well was that soils issues

but this additional soil issue was left

If Mr. Anthony had said,

•Boy,

No

let's look at it," he'd
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have fouoo ···it immediately right then.

2

have said,

3

about it," he'd have found out then.

4

"This is different, we better find out about it," then all of

5

this really could have been sidestepped or at least addressed by

6

the parties.

7

"Well,

If Mr. Mardesich would

this is different, maybe we ought to think
If Sunhill had thought,

Where there is no specific understanding of what the

8

contract is mean and what the bargain is meant between the

9

parties when this thousand year flood or between 500 and 1,000,

10

maybe it's a 750 year flood if there is such a thing, when this

11

occurred no one took the next step to say what are the different

12

circumstances.

13

It may seem somewhat arbitrary for the Court to place

14

that risk in the hands of Sunhill, but they were the ones in

15

charge of the lot during this period of time.

16

plaintiffs and against Sunhill in a sense that this is joint and

17

several liability.

18

amount,

19

contract rate,

20

So I find for the

I go with your theory of judgment in the same

$179,000 plus interest from the date contract -- at the
10 percent from the date of filing of the suit.

Now because of the Court's findings,

plaintiffs are

21

also entitled to their attorney's fees,

22

understand the way the Court deal with the attorney's fees issue

23

is that Mr. Spendlove in behalf of plaintiff will prepare a

24

detailed affidavit of attorney's fees,

25

Court.

and for the parties to

and submit that to the
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DUNN LAW FIRM
Clifford V. Dunn, #933
Adam C. Dunn, #10926
I 10 West Tabernacle
P.O. Box 2318
St. George, UT 84 771
Telephone: (435) 628-5405
Fax: (435) 628-4145
Counsel for Defendant Sun Hill Homes, LC
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
WASHINGTON COUNTY
ORDER VACATING
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND
JUDGMENT;

JOHN MARDESICH, an individual
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,

v.

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND
JUDGMENT

ANTHONY BROS. CONSTRUCTION, a Utah
corporation, dba ANTHONY Bros POOL &
SPA; SUN HILL HOMES, L.C., and JOHN
DOES I-X,

Case No.: 080502342

Defendants/Counterclaimant

Judge: G. Michael Westfall
,--

ANTHONY BROS. CONSTRUCTION, a Utah
corporation, dba ANTHONY BROS. POOL &
SPA,

Third-party Plaintiff

I
I

i
I

i

!

I
!

:

vs.

MARIE MARDESICH, an individual,

On March 17, 2014, Judge James L. Shumate signed the Finding, Conclusions and
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Judgment for this case which was tried before him on December 2 and December 3, 2013. On
March 28, 2014, Defendant Sun Hill Homes, L.C. filed a Motion to Vacate the Judgment, a
Motion For a New Trial, and a Motion To Stay Execution of the Judgment. The Court having
heard argument and being fully advised in the premises, does hereby Vacate the Judgment
against Defendant Sun Hill Homes, L.C., previously entered in the above entitled Court on
March 17, 2014, and does further issue the following Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1.

Sun Hill was the developer and promoter of certain properties within the

Sunbrook Communities, located in Washington County, Utah.
2.

On or about July 31, 2003, Rosenberg Associates provided a Geotechnical

Investigation for Sun Hill Homes for the property that would come to be known as the
Pointe at Sunbrook which is also known as the Woodlands at Sunbrook, the subdivision
where the Plaintiffs Lot 8 is located.
3.

In addition to the Geotechnical Investigation, Rosenberg Associates prepared a

Grading Plan for the Pointe at Sunbrook which is also known as the Woodlands at
Sunbrook, the subdivision where the Plaintiffs Lot 8 is located.
4.

Prior to entering into the REPC, Sun Hill, retained Applied Geotechnical

Engineering Consultants, Inc., (hereinafter "AGEC") to perform various tests and
evaluations on Lots 1-3 and 5-17 in the Woodlands Subdivision, which resulted in a
September 21, 2004 AGEC Geotechnical Investigation.
5.

On or about December 4, 2004, Plaintiff entered into a Real Estate Purchase

Contract for Construction (hereinafter "REPC") with Sun Hill with regard to the property which
is the subject of this litigation (hereinafter "Property" or "Lot 8").
6.

The REPC, dated November 16, 2004, was signed by Marie Mardesich, who was

defined in the REPC as "Buyer''.
7.

. John and Marie Mardesich signed twelve (12) addenda to the REPC from

September 12, 2005 to May 15, 2006.
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8.

The REPC dated November 16, 2004, together with the twelve (12) signed

addenda to the REPC, which addenda were executed from September 12, 2005 to May 15, 2006,
constitute the entire agreement between Plaintiff Mardesich and Defendant Sun Hill Homes,
L.C., and constitute a fully-integrated written contract.
9.

On or about May 16, 2006, Plaintiff and Sun Hil I "closed" on the sale of the

Property and Sun Hill conveyed the Property to Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant by Special
Warranty Deed (hereinafter "Warranty Deed") which was recorded on or about June 6, 2006.
10.

After the property had been deeded to Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant by Sun

Hill, Plaintiff hired Anthony Bros. to construct a pool in the backyard of Lot 8 at the Woodlands.
11.

After June 6, 2006, Plaintiff contracted with Defendant Anthony Bros.

Construction to constmct a pool at the Property conveyed to it by Sun Hill (hereinafter "Pool").
12.

Plaintiff never had a contract with Sun Hill for Sun Hill to construct the Pool.

13.

Sun Hill did not construct the Pool and the Pool was constructed at the Property

after Plaintiff accepted title to the Property.
14.

Defendant Anthony Bros Construction applied for and received a building permit

for the Pool from the City of St. George on or about September 1, 2006.
15.

Anthony Bros dug and excavated the hole for the Pool before commencing the

construction or the installation of the Pool.
16.

The pool and spa experienced significant differential settlement after construction.

17.

Plaintiff John Mardesich had a copy of the soils report and offered it to Anthony

Brothers Construction.
18.

Anthony Brothers Constmction did not accept the copy of the soils report and at

that time was placed on notice of potential soils issues.
19. During the construction of the pool, while the re bar was being placed in the pool
pnor to the application of gunite, Jared Hanks of AGEC noticed the construction of the
swimming pool and went to Anthony Brothers Construction and disclosed potential soils
conditions.
20. Plaintiff John Mardesich did not state to Anthony Brothers that the state of the lot
Page 3
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was pool ready.
21. The action against Anthony Brothers was initiated within the one year time frame
provided by the pool contract, and in addition, such time frame is contrary to public policy.
22. The industry standard and construction of swimming pools and spas is a one inch
differential in elevation from one side of the pool or spa to the other.
23. The swimming pool at the Mardesich home is out of level by approximate 1.2 inches,
and has the potential for additional movement.
24. The spa is clearly out of the one inch standard and has a differential elevation of 1.9
inches.

25. John Mardesich did attempt to contact Anthony Brothers approximately sixty times
without response relating to the swimming pool, creek and spa. As a result of Mr. Mardesich's
attempts to contact Anthony Brothers with no response, the statute of limitations in the contract
was tolled.

26. Exhibit I presented at trial the Real Estate Purchase Contract for constmction is the
agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant Sun Hill Homes.
27. Exhibit 29 as presented at trial is not a part of the contract as it includes a signature
line but contains no signature.

28. At the time Lot 8 was subdivided, it was prepared and graded according to the
grading plan prepared by Rosenberg Associates.
29. Defendant Sun Hill Homes reasonably used the services provided by NRSC to make
changes to the grading of Lot 8.
30.

As a result of the changes made by NRSC the buildable area of Lot 8 was

substantially increased and every linear foot of soil added to Lot 8 required that approximately
27 yards of soil be added to Lot 8.
31.

Exhibit 6, as presented at trial, demonstrates the placement of the riprap and

additional soil on Lot 8.
32. The placement of additional soil on Lot 8 occurred while Lot 8 was under the control
of Sun Hill Homes.
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33. Defendant Sun Hill Homes was aware, through its agents, Roseanne Campbell and
Roger Stratford of Plaintiffs' intention to build a swimming pool in the backyard of Lot 8.
34. While the original plans for the swimming pool had contemplated an infinity pool,
the additional soil added to Lot 8 while under the control of Sun Hill Homes resulted in changed
plans for the swimming pool.
35. The decision to change the style of the swimming pool built was a result of the
changed grading of Lot 8 and was reasonable.
36. After the change in grading to Lot 8, Sun Hill Homes took no action to investigate
the effect the changed grading had on the suitability of the Lot for the construction of a
swimming pool.
3 7. The REPC poses no duty on Sun Hill Homes to investigate the suitability of the soil
added to Lot 8 for its intended use as a buildable lot for the construction of a swimming pool.
38. There was never an agreement between Plaintiff Mardesich and Defendant Sun Hill
that Sun Hill would be responsible to insure the suitability of the soil for constmction of a
swimming poo 1
39. Because the RECP posed no duty on Sun Hill Homes to investigate the suitability of
the soil added to Lot 8 for its intended use as a buildable lot for the construction of a swimming
pool, and because there was no agreement between the parties, that Sun Hill would be responbile
to insure the suitability of the soil for a swimming pool, the risk associated with the placement of
the additional soil is placed upon the Plaintiff Mardesich.
40. Because there was no duty upon Sun Hill to investigate the suitability of the soil for a
swimming pool, Sun Hill did not breach the contract by failing to conduct such investigation.
Based upon the findings and conclusions above~

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff John Mardesich and third-party defendant
Marie Mardesich are hereby awarded judgment against Defendant Anthony Bros. Constmction,
in the amount of $179,000.00 plus interest in the amount of $60,320.55 which is calculated at a
rate of ten percent (10%) from date of filing the Amended Complaint which was July 22, 2010,
through the date of judgment of December 3, 2013, plus attorney's fees as allowed by contract in
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the amount of $64,953.03, for a total of $303,913.58. In addition, the judgment amount of
$303,913.58 shall continue to accrue post-judgment interest at the rate of 2.13 percent.

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that all causes of action of any nature of any
kind by John Mardesich and Marie Mardesich as against Sun Hill Homes, L.C. be and are hereby
dismissed as having no basis in fact or in law.

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the Supersedeas Bond posted by Sun Hill
Homes, L.C. on August I, 2014 is hereby exonerated and the Clerk of the Court is hereby
directed to return said funds to Defendant Sun Hill Homes, L.C.

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the issue of attorney's fees claimed by Sun
Hill Homes, L.C. against Plaintiff John Mardesich may be addressed by further motion.

- - - - - - E N D OF O R D E R - - - - - -

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT
JENSENBAYLES, LLP

Isl James L. Spendlove
Signed by Clifford V. Dunn with permission of James L. Spendlove

JAMES L. SPENDLOVE
Attorney for Plaintiff
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1

John and Marie Mardesich who are here in the courtroom today?

2

A,

Many times, yes.

3

Q.

When was the first time you recall meeting with them?

4

A.

Well, we met -- I couldn't give you a date, but we met

5

several times prior to their purchase,

We looked at different

6

possibilities, models, talked about options several different

7

times before they made a decision to purchase.

I

;

;

I:

1.8

l;
I~
ri

1.8

~,

f.[
~

-·-··--·

"' I
Id

I

8

9

10

Q.

Do you recall during those discussions if you had any

specific conversations with them regarding what they desired for
the home?

11

MR. DUNN:

Objection, your Honor.

It appears as where

12

we're going is to a discussion about the nature -- formation of

13

the contract.

14

evidence.

15

specific integration clause that refers to -- that -- and it's

16

paragraph 29 of the real estate purchase agreement which states

17

that the REP-C itself is the -- constitutes the entire agreement

18

between the buyer and the seller --

Well, the contract has not been entered into

We have no objection to it being so, but there's a

19

THE

20

MR. DUNN:

21

THE

COURT:

COURT:

So your objection that this is parole?
Yes.
Well -- and Ms. Campbell, we're using

22

we're speaking lawyer here for a minute.

23

saying is that this is outside the four corners of the contract

24

and not admissible into evidence.

25

ambiguity in the contract that would justify the Court looking at

What we're really

Counsel, is there some

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I'
-10-

I~

I'.

1
2

I

r
I.

-1~ -·--- --·- · -.. -

MR. SPENDLOVE:

Your Honor, as far as the integration in

3

the contract, there isn't, although that's not where I'm going

4

with this.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. SPENDLOVE:

7

THE COURT:

All right.
It is not to that point.

All right.

8

objection on parole.

9

let's set the framework.

10

I:

the parole in any way, shape or form?

Let's not go into parole evidence, but
Go ahead.

BY MR. SPENDLOVE:

Q.

Well, I'm going to sustain an

Back to the question.

I'll speed

11

this along for the purposes.

12

discussions with the Mardesiches regarding the construction

13

of a swimming pool?

Do you recall ever having

14

A.

Yes, several times.

15

Q,

It was their desire to have a swimming pool; is that

16

17
18

correct?
A.

Yes.
MR. DUNN:

Objection, your Honor.

I don't know

19

whether this complies with the contract.

20

conversations were prior to the execution of the agreement.

21

negotiations have been superceded by the contract, and therefore

22

discussions about the swimming pool are still parole.

23

TBE COURT:

She stated that her
All

I will receive it not for its obviously
-- . ·--------·-·· ---- -····· ----··· -- - ·-- ---- -- -· ····- .. -

··-·-·- -· -··-·-··"-·-·-····· ·- - - ··-·--·· --·-

24

parole purpose, but just to explain the actions of the parties

25

as they engaged in this process, the contract itself so far
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1

controls.

2

MR.

3

THE COURT:

4

Mr.

Thank you,
I

your Honor.

see where we're going.

Go ahead,

Spendlove.

5

6

DUNN:

MR.

Q.

SPENDLOVE:

BY MR.

Thank you,

SPENDLOVE:

your Honor.

That was some of the times you said

7

you had discussions with the Mardesiches prior to entering into

8

an agreement to purchase what was lot 8;

is that correct?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Did you have any discussions with them after entering

Uh-huh.

11

into the agreement regarding the construction of the home and the

12

lot on lot 8?

13

14
15
16

A.

Yes,

and we discussed the pool several times after they

made the agreement to purchase that particular lot.

Q.

Do you recall previously in this matter that you signed

an affidavit?

Do you recall doing that?

17

Jl••

Oh,

18

Q.

I have it up on the screen.

regarding this specific matter here?

Yes,

I did.

It hasn't been made an

19

exhibit to these proceedings because we have you here with us to

20

talk about it.

21
22
23
24
25

A.

Uh-huh.
THE COURT:

Counsel,

any problem admitting the affidavit

at this juncture?
MR.

DUNN:

Your Honor,

if the witness is here,

to me that it would be appropriate for us to have cross
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